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CHAPTER 7 
Domestic Relations and Persons 
MONROE INKER 
§7.1. Divorce: Cruel and abusive treatment. Reed v. Reed 1 is a 
significant case in the development of the concept of cruelty as em-
ployed in the Massachusetts statute enumerating the grounds for di-
vorce.2 Cruelty was established as a ground for divorce in a period of 
social history when physical force was a recognized factor in maintain-
ing connubial order. This notion of the subjection of one spouse to 
the other inevitably had its impact upon the judicial interpretation of 
the term "cruelty," which was accentuated by the strict interpretation 
characterizing the judicial approach. Thus, in order to establish "ex-
treme cruelty," which was the term then used in the statute,3 it was 
imperative that there be evidence of physical violence.4 It was a con-
siderable time before it became recognized that physical violence was 
not an essential element of cruelty in this context. 
In the leading cases of Bailey v. Bailey5 and Cowles v. Cowles,6 it 
was settled that statutory cruelty was established if the conduct proven 
was such as to cause injury to life, limb, or health, or to create a danger 
of such injury or a reasonable apprehension of such injury. Implicit 
in these cases is the concept that acts detrimental to health come within 
the definition of bodily harm. Not until the case of W- v. W_7 did 
the Supreme Judicial Court explicitly decide that any unjustifiable 
conduct on the part of either spouse that so affected the mental state 
or so destroyed the peace of mind of the other as seriously to impair 
bodily health constituted cruelty within the statute, although no phys-
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§7.1. 1340 Mass. 321, 163 N.E.2d 919 (1960). 
2 G.L., c. 208, §l. 
3 R.S., c. 76, §6 (1836), provided that a divorce from bed and board could be 
granted for "extreme cruelty." G.S., c. 107, §9 (1860), provided for divorce on 
grounds of either "extreme cruelty" or "cruel and abusive treatment." Acts of 
1870, c. 404, §2, retained essentially the same language. Subsequently, "extreme 
cruelty" was omitted from the revisions. See Mass. G.L., c. 208, §1 (Ter. ed. 1932). 
4 Warren v. Warren, 3 Mass. 321 (1807). 
597 Mass. 373 (1867). 
6 1I2 Mass. 298 (1873). 
7141 Mass. 495, 6 N.E. 541, 55 Am. Rep. 491 (1886). 
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ical violence was inflicted or even threatened. Recognition that im-
pairment of health is a form of bodily harm and may be encompassed 
through the medium of emotional distress is, in effect, judicial recog-
nition of mental cruelty as a ground for divorce. 
This enlargement to include mental cruelty within the definition of 
cruelty as a ground for divorce has been held within strict limits by a 
line of cases that hold that conduct not involving physical violence 
must have been accompanied by malevolent intent to justify a decree 
on the ground of cruelty.8 Thus, in the leading case of Armstrong v. 
Armstrong9 the libelant sought a divorce on the ground of cruel and 
abusive treatment. The judge of probate found that there was no evi-
dence of physical violence but that the libelant's health was actually 
impaired by the conduct of the libelee in consorting with another 
women. He dismissed the libel and reported the case to the Supreme 
Judicial Court. The Court affirmed the order dismissing the libel, 
stating: 
Neither words nor acts which do not involve physical violence, 
inflicted on the other party, are sufficient to constitute cruel and 
abusive treatment within the meaning of the statute, unless it is 
shown that the language was uttered or these acts were committed 
with a malicious intent and for the purpose of injuring the libel-
lant.10 
The basis of Armstrong v. Armstrong is rejected by the Court in 
Reed v. Reed. The Court adverts to Bailey v. Bailey, to the effect that 
cruelty 
is broad enough to include mere words, if they . . . tend to 
wound the feelings to such a degree as to affect the health of the 
party, or create a reasonable apprehension that it may be affected. 
. . . [D]eeply wounded sensibility and wretchedness of mind can 
hardly fail to affect health.!1 
In the Reed case, the probate judge found that the libelee was keep-
ing company with another man. The libelant requested the libelee to 
break this relationship and she refused. As a result, the health of the 
libelant was affected and he lost weight. The probate court granted 
a decree nisi for divorce and the libelee appealed. 
The Court held that the libelant's injury was a natural consequence 
of the libelee's wrongful conduct and affirmed the decree. The result 
of the Reed case is that it is no longer necessary in order to maintain 
a libel for divorce grounded on cruelty to prove malevolence when 
8 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 229 Mass. 592, 118 N.E. 916, L.R.A. 1918D 426 (1918); 
Turner v. Turner, 234 Mass. 37, 124 N.E. 721 (1919); Curtiss v. Curtiss, 243 Mass. 
51,136 N.E. 829 (1922). 
9229 Mass. 592,118 N.E. 916, L.R.A. 1918D 426 (1918). 
10229 Mass. at 594, 118 N.E. at 917, L.R.A. 1918D at 427. 
11 340 Mass. 321, 323, 163 N.E.2d 919, 920 (1960), quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 97 Mass. 
373, 381 (1867). 
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there is an absence of physical injury. Now the issue is whether the 
acts or words of the libelee had a physically injurious effect upon the 
libelant. Quoting an earlier case, the Court stated: 
To establish cruel and abusive treatment it is not necessary to 
prove that the libellee had a malevolent intent to cause physical 
injury to the body or to the health of the libellant, it being suffi-
cient to prove that such was the natural consequence of his con-
duct and that harm resulted or was reasonably likely to follow the 
acts of the libellee.12 
The foregoing language indicates that it is within the range of pos-
sibility in a particular case that the trial judge may conceivably con-
clude on the evidence before him that the particular course of conduct 
shown to have occurred would not be likely to be the cause of physical 
harm to the complaining party. The libelant need not, of course, sub-
mit to conduct likely to impair his or her health, but if the conduct is 
of such a character, the injured party may terminate the relationship 
without being required to submit until actual physical harm ensues. 
This being the case, the question must be asked, how far in fact are the 
Massachusetts divorce courts from granting divorce on the ground of 
incompatibility? It may be done in a number of cases under the guise 
of cruel and abusive treatment, but that concept would seem now to 
have been extended by Reed v. Reed to its ultimate possible limit. 
§7.2. Change of name: Petition in Probate Court. Rusconi, Peti-
tioner} was a petition in the Probate Court for Bristol County for a 
change of name brought by Joseph Paul Rusconi and his wife in behalf 
of themselves and their children for the purpose of having their sur-
names changed from Rusconi to Bryan.2 The parents and a brother 
and sister of the male petitioner appeared in opposition to the petition. 
The probate judge, after hearing, entered a decree dismissing the peti-
tion and the petitioners appealed. The report of material facts filed 
by the judge of probate was summarized by the Supreme Judicial Court 
as follows: 
The Rusconi family is well known and respected in the commu-
nity, and is prominent in Italian circles. As a result of the present 
proceedings "injuries to the feelings and sensibilities of the mem-
bers of the Rusconi family have resulted"; they have been "held 
up to ridicule and embarrassment, in this predominantly Italian 
community." The objecting members of the family are "proud of 
12 MO Mass. at 323, 163 N .E.2d at 920. This language was quoted from the 
Court's opinion in Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256,257,192 N.E. 501 (19M). 
§7.2. 11960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873,167 N.E.2d 847. 
2 G.L., c. 210, §12, provides: "A petition for the change of name of a person may 
be heard by the probate court in the county where the petitioner resides. No 
change of name of a person, except upon the adoption of a child under this chapter 
or upon the marriage or divorce of a woman, shall be lawful unless made by said 
court for a sufficient reason consistent with public interests." 
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the name Rusconi, and feel that this petition is a slur to the Italian 
race." . . . There "exists no confusion or inconvenience over the 
use of the name, Rusconi." The "nature and purpose of the re-
quest for the change of name in this instance [is] an affront to 
those bearing the name of Rusconi in particular and the Italian 
race in general." S 
The Supreme Judicial Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Spalding, 
held that it was not within the discretionary power of the probate judge 
to deny a petition brought under the statute because he felt that the 
desired change was un-American and an affront to persons of a partic-
ular race or origin. The final decree was reversed and a decree allow-
ing the petition was ordered by the Court. 
Appreciation of the meaning of the Rusconi decision requires a brief 
glance at the background of cases and statutes that preceded it. The 
common law of Massachusetts permitted a man to change his name and 
assume any other name without resort to legal proceedings provided 
the change was not motivated by a fraudulent or dishonest intent.4 In 
1851, the first statute allowing a change of name by judicial decree was 
enacted in the Commonwealth.5 It provided that no change of name 
should be made without sufficient reason consonant with the public 
interest and satisfactory to the court. In its present form in the Gen-
eral Laws6 the provision that the proposed change of name must be 
satisfactory to the court has been omitted and the only limitation upon 
granting a petition for a change of name is that it must be "for a suffi-
cient reason consistent with public interests." 
While the statute appears to vest discretion in the probate judge 
before whom a change of name petition is heard, no criteria are set 
forth whereby the judge's exercise of discretion may be measured. In 
Merolevitz, Petitioner,7 and Buyarsky, Petitioner,S the Supreme Judi-
cial Court discussed the principles that govern a change of name both 
at common law and under the statute. Both opinions were cited with 
approval in the Rusconi case and both emphasize that the Massachu-
setts statute does not abrogate the common law right to change of 
name. 
Although Buyarsky and Merolevitz can be said to be limited by their 
special facts, the two opinions clearly indicate that the right of one to 
change his name by judicial decree under the statute is a very broad 
one. Neither case, however, attempts to interpret the meaning of 
"sufficient reason" for a decree under the statute. Nor does the Rusconi 
decision attempt to give the practicing attorney any guideposts for 
determining the extent of the statutory limitation. 
31960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873, 874·875,167 N.E.2d 847, 849. 
4 Buryarsky, Petitioner, 322 Mass. 335, 338, 77 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1948); Liddell v. 
Middlesex Motor Co., 275 Mass. 346, 352,175 N.E. 737, 739 (1931). 
1\ Acts of 1851, c. 256, §l. 
6 G.L., c. 210, §12, quoted in note 2 supra . 
. 7320 Mass. 488, 70 N .E.2d 249 (1946). 
8322 Mass. 335, 77 N.E.2d 216 (1948). 
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On the facts of the Rusconi case it is not a "sufficient reason con-
sistent with public policy" to deny a petition under G.L., c. 210, §12, 
merely because the desired change will offend a particular ethnic or 
national group. However, when the Rusconi decision is read in the 
light of the Buyarsky and Merolevitz opinions, it would appear that 
the Supreme Judicial Court is by implication establishing the common 
law rule for change of name as the criterion for a change of name under 
the statutory procedure. As stated by the Court: "It is not open to the 
court to inquire into the motives that prompt one to change one's 
name, provided, of course, they are not for dishonest or unlawful 
ends." II 
This interpretation of the statute would seem to render the statutory 
right to change one's name co-extensive with the right at common law, 
by making the right turn upon whether the change can be shown to be 
contrary to public interest rather than upon the ability of the peti-
tioner to come forward affirmatively with adequate reasons why he 
should be permitted to change his name. Thus, the Probate Court 
cannot deny a petition brought under the statute if the petitioner is 
acting honestly. As yet, however, the Supreme Judicial Court has not 
found it necessary to decide this point specifically. It remains for 
future decisions to determine whether this is a correct analysis of the 
existing state of the law. 
II 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 873. 876. 167 N.E.2d 847. 850. 
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